The World Upside Down: De-legitimizing Political Finance Regulation


GT 5.1 ¿Cómo analizar y explicar la corrupción desde la Ciencia Política y de la Administración?

Autor/a
Fernando Casal Bertoa (University of Nottingham)
Coautor/es
Fransje Molenaar (Universidad de Leiden)
Daniela Piccio
Ekaterina Rashkova
Programa:
Sesión 1
Día: viernes,20 de septiembre de 2013
Hora: 11:45 a 14:15
Lugar: E10SEM9

Political finance regulation is often praised in terms of its ability to introduce equality among political parties, to create more transparent political parties and to lower the influence of affluent donors on the political decision-making process. Little examination exists, however, of the effectiveness of this type of regulation. This paper aims to fill this gap by addressing whether and to what extent different types of public funding regulations have improved the legitimacy of political parties by improving their image in terms of corruption. Towards this end, and focusing on both European and Latin American democracies, this paper investigates whether a relationship indeed exists between the perceived corruption of political parties and the regulation of political finance. It finds such a relationship does exist, although not in the direction commonly stipulated by the advocates of party finance regulation.

Palabras clave: party corruption, public subsidies, state dependency, funding control, sanctions