Publicada por Springer

Autores. Schofield, Norman y Gonzalo Caballero

INDICE

Introduction. Norman Schofield (Washington University, St. Louis) and Gonzalo Caballero (University of Vigo)

Part I: INSTITUTIONS

1-    Institutions: Rules or Equilibria?. Avner Greif (Stanford University) and Christopher Kingston (Amherst College)

2-    War, Wealth and the Formation of States. Carles Boix (Princeton University), Bruno Codenotti (Institute for Informatics and Telematics) and Giovanni Resta(Institute for Informatics and Telematics)

3-    Why Do Weak States Prefer Prohibition to Taxation?. Desiree A. Desierto (University of Pfilippines)and John V.C. Nye (George Mason University)

4-    Self-Enforcing, Public-Order Institutions for Contract Enforcement: Litigation, Regulation, and Limited Government in Venice. Yadira González de Lara (Universidad de Valencia; Universidad CEU-Cardenal Herreria

5-    Judicial Stability During Regime Change: Apex Courts in India 1937?1960. Alfred W. Darnell and Sunita Parikh (Washington University in St. Louis)

6-    Institutional Arrangements Matter for Both Efficiency and Distribution: Contributions and Challenges of the New Institutional Economics. Fernando Toboso (University of Valencia)

7-    Institutional Foundations, Committee System and Amateur Legislators in the Governance of the Spanish Congress: An Institutional Comparative Perspective (USA, Argentina, Spain). Gonzalo Caballero (University of Vigo).

8-    Coalition Governments and Electoral Behavior: Who Is Accountable?. Ignacio Urquizu-Sancho (Universidad Complutense).

Part II: DEMOCRACY AND VOTING

9-    Empirical and Formal Models of the United States Presidential Elections in 2000 and 2004. Norman Schofield, Christopher Claassen, Maria Gallego, and Ugur Ozdemir (Washington University in St. Louis)

10- Modelling Elections in Post-Communist Regimes: Voter Perceptions, Political Leaders and Activists, Norman Schofield, JeeSeon Jeon, Marina Muskhelishvili, Ugur Ozdemir, and Margit Tavits(Washington University in St. Louis)

11- Electoral Systems and Party Responsiveness. Lawrence Ezrow (University of Essex)

12- Electoral Institutions and Political Corruption: Ballot Structure, Electoral Formula, and Graft. Daniel Max Kselman (Juan March Institute)

13- A Model of Party Entry in Parliamentary Systems with Proportional Representation. Daniel M. Kselman (Juan March Institute) and Joshua A. Tucker (New York University).

14- Moving in Time: Legislative Party Switching as Time-Contingent Choice. Carol Mershon (University of Virginia) and Olga Shvetsova (Binghamton University)

15- On the Distribution of Particularistic Goods. Jon X. Eguia (New York University) and Antonio Nicolo (Universita degli Studi di Padova).

16- Vote Revelation: Empirical Content of Scoring Rules. Andrei Gomberg (ITAM-México).