

Patterns of support and opposition in comitology (2008-2012)

Ana Mar Fernández Pasarín, *UAB*, Barcelona Renaud Dehousse, *CEE/Sciences Po*, Paris Joan Pere Plaza i Font, *ESCI-UPF/UAB*, Barcelona

Presentation prepared for the 'XII Congreso español de Ciencia Política y de la Administración', Universidad del País Vasco, San Sebastián, 13-15 July 2015

1. Previous work and debates

Dehousse, Fernández and Plaza (2014, JEPP).

Debate on the nature of the decisional logics at work within Executive Committees:

• Does it reproduce an intergovernmental model (Pollack, 2003) or rather a consensus-oriented one (Joerges and Neyer, 1997)?

Problem: How can one assess the quality of interactions? How can one measure the weight of arguments? How can one assess the support vs opposition to the Commission's proposals?

2. The proposed strategy

Step 1. Look at the output of committee proceedings

- Dismissed as inconclusive: 'consensual nature' of comitology (7 rejections out of 2185 decisions in 2008): compatible with different explanations (i.e. the eventual adoption of Commission proposals does not preclude the existence of a degree of conflictuality)
- Definition of conflictuality: the absence of a unanimous position in favour a draft measure proposed by the Commission

Step 2. Change the focus: look at the way committees decide (voting records)

Step 3. Focus on Instances of Dissent with Commission proposals How frequent are they? What kind of explanatory factors can be offered?

3. First Findings (2008 sample):

- Dissent in 25% of the cases
- Stronger in Regulatory committees
- And in some policy areas (ENERG, CLIMA, SANCO, always in relative frequencies)

4. Objectives of the current research

- Enlarge the sample so as to assess the impact of the post-Lisbon reform (2008-2012; N=6394; valid cases: 5608)
- Focus on opposition to Commission's proposals rather than dissensus among MS representatives within committees
- Provide a finer measure of the intensity of opposition to Commission proposals (Index of opposition, O)
- Identify the factors that may explain variations

5. Featuring Opposition

	Full Support	Opposition	Total
2008	499	152 23,35%	651
2009	659	195 22,83%	854
2010	739	175 19,15%	914
2011	1218	416 25,46%	1634
2012	1182	373 23,99%	1555
Total	4297	1311 23,38%	5608

Table 1. Full Support VS. Opposition (2008-2012)

Levels of Opposition appear stable ...

6. How can one explain levels of opposition?

6.1. Through the analysis of Policy Sectors...

	Full Support	Opposition	Total
AGRI	243	193 44,27%	436
BUDG	0	2 100%	2
CLIMA	27	27 50,00%	54
COMM	22	o 0,00%	22
CONNECT	60	27 31,03%	87
DEVCO	540	71 11,62%	611
DIGIT	4	o 0,00%	4
EAC	224	46 17,04%	270
ECHO	133	18 11,92%	151
EMPL	23	2 8,00%	25
ENERG	28	24 46,15%	52
ENLARG	87	17 16,35%	104
ENTR	139	51 26,84%	190
ENV	168	122 42,07%	290

Table 2. Frequencies, breakdown by Policy Field

	Full Support	Opposition	Total
ESTAT	55	52 48,60%	107
FPIS	6	0 0,00%	6
HOME	124	31 20,00%	155
JUST	16	7 30,43%	23
MARE	36	15 29,41%	51
MARKT	53	14 20,90%	67
MOVE	191	83 30,29%	274
REGIO	1	7 87,50%	8
RTD	299	14 4,47%	313
SANCO	1749	347 16,56%	2096
SEGEN	2	13 86,67%	15
TAXUD	60	128 68,09%	188
TRADE	7	0 0,00%	7
Total	4297	1311 23,38%	5608

Huge variations from one area to the other....

6.2. Through the analysis of the Type of Procedure...

	Full			
	Support	Op	position	Total
Advisory (a)	45	6	11,76%	51
Management (a)	1235	128	9,39%	1363
Regulatory (a)	442	246	35,76%	688
Regulatory with S. (a)	415	309	42,68%	724
Advisory (b)	7	1	12,50%	8
Examination (b)	2148	621	22,43%	2769
Total	4292	1311	23,40%	5603

Table 3. Breakdown by type of Procedure (2008-2012)

(a) Pre-Lisbon (b) Post-Lisbon

The Intergovernmentalist thesis: The Stricter the Procedure, the Tighter the Control...

6.3. Through the analysis of the Policy Types Thesis

	Full Support	Opposition	Total
Regulatory (a)	2465	800 24,50%	3265
Spending (b)	1440	349 19,51%	1789
50-50 (c)	309	97 23,89%	406
Int. Services (d)	83	65 43,92%	148
Total	4297	1311 23,38%	5608

Table 4. Breakdown by type of Policy Area

(a) Includes: BUDG, CLIMA, ECOFIN, ENERG,
ENV, FPIS, HOME, JUST, MARE, MARKT, MOVE,
SANCO, TAXUD, TRADE
(b) Includes: AGRI, DEVCO, EAC, ECHO, REGIO,

RTD

(c) Includes: CONNECT, EMPL, ENLARG, ENTR (d) Includes: COMM, DIGIT, ESTAT, SEGEN

Policy Types don't seem to make a clear difference

7. Index of Opposition

- Focus on Commission proposals, given central role of Commission in comitology
- Abstention lesser form of opposition since QMV generally required to prevent Commission from implementing its proposals
- Tacit agreement regarded as support (cfr 2011 regulation)
- No support regarded as opposition (Abstentions)

 $O = \frac{Against + 0,5 \cdot Abstention}{For + Tacit Agreement + Against + Abstention}$

Considering General Features

Table 5. Index of Opposition. Breakdown per year

			Std.
	Max.	Mean	Deviation
2008	0,95797	0,07900	0,10831
2009	0,50580	0,11380	0,11785
2010	0,47681	0,08388	0,09278
2011	0,81449	0,12552	0,14051
2012	0,71449	0,10959	0,12029
Total	0,95797	0,10829	0,12327

Opposition levels low and stable

Index of Opposition, categories of intensity




Table 6. Index of Opposition. Breakdown per Type of Procedure

		Weak osition (1)		/ledium osition (2)		ijoritarian oposition (3)		Qualified position (4)	Total
Advisory (a)	5	83,33%	1	16,67%	0	0,00%	0	0,00%	6
Management (a)	106	82,81%	21	16,41%	1	0,78%	0	0,00%	128
Regulatory (a)	218	88,62%	24	9,76%	3	1,22%	1	0,41%	246
Regulatory with S. (a)	301	97,41%	6	1,94%	2	0,65%	0	0,00%	309
Advisory (b)	1	100%	0	0,00%	0	0,00%	0	0,00%	1
Examination (b)	542	87,28%	61	9,82%	14	2,25%	4	0,64%	621
Total	1173	89,47%	113	8,62%	20	1,53%	5	0,38%	1311

(a) Pre-Lisbon (b) Post-Lisbon (1) [0-0,26376]
 (2) [0,26377-0,50145]
 (3) [0,50146 0,73193]
 (4) [0,73914-1]

Weak opposition is the rule for all procedures....

...Yet it is more frequent when procedures foresee tighter control

Regulatory (a)	737	92,13%	51	6,38%	9	1,13%	3	0,38%	800
Spending (b)	286	81,95%	53	15,19%	9	2,58%	1	0,29%	349
50-50 (c)	97	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	97
Int. Services (d)	53	81,54%	9	1 3, 85%	2	3,08%	1	1,54%	65
Total	1173	89,47%	113	8,62%	20	1,53%	5	0,38%	1311

Table 7. Index of Opposition. Breakdown per Type of Policy

(a) Includes: BUDG, CLIMA, ECOFIN, ENERG, ENV, FPIS, HOME, JUST, MARE,

MARKT, MOVE, SANCO, TAXUD, TRADE	(2) [0,26377-0,50145]
(b) Includes: AGRI, DEVCO, EAC, ECHO, REGIO, RTD	(3) [0,50146-0,73193]
(c) Includes: CONNECT, EMPL, ENLARG, ENTR	(4) [0,73914-1]

(1) [0-0,26376]

The Type of policy does not appear to have a meaningful impact on levels of opposition

8. Assessing Lisbon

Table 8 The Impact of Lisbon coming-into-force

					Std.
	Fre	quency	Max.	Mean	Deviation
pre-Lisbon	<i>522</i>	39,82%	0,957971	0,09363341	0,108135456
post-Lisbon	789	60,18%	0,814493	0,117989	0,131499963

A slightly increase in Opposition descriptives

Conclusions

- Our analysis confirms that opposition to Commission proposals is limited in comitology procedures: opposition is rare and weak.
- Post-Lisbon changes do not appear to have had a decisive impact at this level.
- Classical intergovernmental approaches can explain the frequency of opposition, not its intensity.
- We still need to possible sociological institutionalist hypotheses (number of meetings, of decisions, etc)